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Who Do You Think You Are? 

The Authorized Balinese 

I first heard the story of the Nubian and the Roman circus under somewhat 
dubious circumstances, which need not detain us here, from a consultant of 
the British Transport Authority whose job it was to persuade the British 
public and politicians that increasing the size and number of juggernauts 
would be of great benefit to the environment. As it is a shaggy dog story, I 
give only the gist. 
During the heyday of Roman circuses a group of mixed Christians was to be 
fed to the lions. As they were escorted in front of [he expectantly cheering 
crowd , a giant Nubian man gendy grouped his fellow believers together and 
told them to leave the lions to him . By various means the Nubian dispatched 
the first three males who attacked with great efficiency. Neither the audience, 
nor the Caesar, were pleased at this peremptory reversal of Iheir anticipated 
afternoon's entertainment. So the lions were caged , a troupe of gladiators sent 
in to seize, bind and bury the Nubian up to his neck in the sand. When the lions 
were released again it took some time before a cautious male stepped up to 
the immobilized Christian, sniffed him and decided it was safe to proceed to 
lunch. As he passed over the Nubian , however , the latter undeterred twisted 
his neck and bit off the animal's genitals. Upon which a voice from the crowd 
was heard to call out: 'Fight fair, you black bastard!' History does not relate 
subsequent events. 
This party piece embodies themes which some anthropologists may find 
unsavoury, concerned as they maintain themselves to be with understand­
ing and explaining people in other cultures to a more or less uninterested 
world. Behind this safe liberal attitude however , lurk more similarities with 
the Romans in the story than most care, or dare, to admit. Who, after all, 
represents these others? And on whose tenns are they , as a recent school 
of thought would have it, allowed their voices back ? 
I n praise of pillage 
'Quietness, grown sick of rest , would purge 

By any desperate change.' 
 (Anthony and Cleopatra I. iii) 
Anthropologists have a reputation as a predatory lineage. They are great 
colonizers: so we now have the anthropology-of-almost-anything from 
violence or evil to women, and doubtless soon premature balding. While 
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consists in the inscription of social action (strictly, 'our own constructions 
of other people's constructions'-Geertz 1973: 9) . This is made possible 
by the 'fixing' of transient human discourse into autonomous text, detached 
from actual utterances and speakers' intentions. Culture therefore can, and 
should , be read like a text. A logical development is to submit ethnographies 
themselves to textual analysis which , as fate would have it, casts serious 
doubts on its original prophet's own pronouncements (see Clifford 1983: 
132-33; Crapanzano 1986: 68-76). The textual critics also identify 
themselves with an assortment of 'post-structuralist' and effectively ' post­
Marxist' French thinkers. Despite internal differences in stress, the latter 
are generally sceptical of the humanist focus on interpretation and meaning 
of the former. They presume distrust in the capacity of reason and language 
to reveal eternal, or even immediate, truths, preferring instead to stress the 
play of power in cultural discourse. Discourse on this reading is closer to 
the preconditions of action and speech, its historical context, than to the 
voices of human actors. There are important differences between the main 
protagonists (Hobart 1985). Whether attempting a synthesis and rendering 
allegiance both unto Caesar and unto God is sophisticated eclecticism or 
plain philosophical naivete, depends a bit on whether one takes the textu­
alists' own view or that of their critics. 
One of the textualists' main charges is that anthropologists (usually 
BritiSh) have been slow to appreciate that ethnographies do not simply 
capture and encapsulate facts . Some of the accused whom I know agree, 
others contend they have taken it into account from the first, others seem 
not to grasp what all the fuss is about. There is certainly a prima facie case 
for arguing that writing is not a neutral medium between reality and its 
representaJ.i.on, but a process with its own history and implications. Look­
ing, for ins'fance, at textual traditions allows the exploration of such issues 
as how regional differences were construed, how they become perpetuated 
and affect the course of inquiry. What began as a useful corrective to a naive 
theory of representation (Clifford 1983) has come, however, to lay claim, 
in such works as Writing Culture,' to be a full-blown vision of anthropology 
as critical textuality, ethnography as polyphony, or culture as genre. 
At this point the problems begin . While juicy images are eye-catching and 
suitably erudite sources-abstruse Polish logicians or obscure Elizabethans 
are to be recommended-<>ften secure professional preferment, ideas in­
volve presuppositions and have implications beyond their immediate appli­
cation. Although a critical reading of ethnography proposes a purgative of 
Western ethnocentrism , as a theoretical approach it easily becomes a glar­
ing example of what it condemns, because it is riddled with its own cultural 
conceptions-hence the American and French Foucaults. Like SO much 
'reftexive' thinking, what purports to be radical and emancipatory, on close 
scrutiny turns out to be unreftective , conservative, and subtly hegemonic. 
It requires everyone to participate on its own tenns . 
Such remarks about evidently well-meaning scholars need substantiation. 
In what follows I consider critically the implications of several linked, if not 
obvious, presuppositions of this textual criticism. These include such old 
stand-bys as a material metaphor of culture, the psychic unity of mankind, 
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the metaphysics of presence and a correspondence theory of meaning, 
which may be explicitly eschewed but are unwittingly retained. These 
combine in a nai've theory of agency. (Crudely, culture is treated as the 
negotiated product of a dialogue between humans who share a common 
subjectivity expressed in different cultural styles but which is revealed by a 
sensitive reading of their authentic voices.) If this seems simplistic, it looks 
pretty polished compared to the better known anthropological accounts of 
South East Asia. Both though achieve a sort of hegemony by establishing 
the superiority of the knowing author over their objects of study and, 
recursively, reconstitute the peoples;n question and authorize them to exist 
and act in quite alien ways. Even the brief analysis ofone culture, Bali, with 
which I conclude, suggests the currency of ideas about identity and agency 
which are entirely precluded from recognition. 
In short, although the new textual criticism is notionally concerned 
with how we distort the Other, it lands up indulging our seemingly endless 
passion with ourselves, our language, metaphors and intellectual spectacles, 
and oddly leaves other peoples even more remote than before. (Ironically, 
Foucault's suggestively impersonal epithet, 'the Other', has increasingly 
become an anthropological convenience for lumping the rest of the world 
together .) The concern with ethnography as knowledge overlooks the world 
of action and agents of which it is part. So, despite claiming to embrace the 
Other and liberate its polyphonic discourse, such approaches perpetuate the 
vision of the anthropologist as the superior 'knowing subject' who benefi­
cently grants the Other its right to appear on its own behalf in the circus of 
contemporary academe. Unfortunately, like the Nubian, the Other has first 
been safely trussed up in relations of economic and political dependence , 
and firmly embedded in the sands of Western intellectual categories. So 
much is fairly familiar. The cruellest cut of all, however, is that the Other 
is only authorized to participate according to Western notions of self and 
action, and so is liable to be deemed not to be playing fair when it does not 
co-operate. 
On authors and authorizing 
'Is there no voice more wonhy than my own?' 
(Julius Caesar iii, 1,49) 
How much weight can one give to a criticism, the intellectual founda­
tions of which are rocky? The question arises because some textual 
criticism is quite apposite, even if the theory on which it claims to draw is 
confused and contradictory. For example, in his article 'On ethnographic 
authority' Clifford is illuminating on assumptions about authority and 
competence in ethnography by participant-observation (1983: 124-30), 
as is Crapanzano in questioning the authorial presence in Geertz's analysis 
(1972) of Balinese cockfights (1986: 68-75). The approach seems most 
effective when exploring the construction of authority and implicit forms of 
power (Asad 1986: Rabinow 1986) : and to become precious and derivative 
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when it apes literary criticism. Perhaps part of its success as a critique is that 
it shares much common ground with what it engages. However, the price 
of such self-reflective criticism, besides being infinitely regressive, is that it 
privileges the anthropologist and Western academic cultures at the expense 
of the supposed subject. 
To elucidate these remarks, certain points are worth noting in Clifford's 
article and in various contributions to Writing Culture. Clifford imagines a 
post-critical 'generalized ethnography' which is suited to an 'ambiguous, 
multi-vocal world' (1983: 119). The key problem is 'how is unruly experi­
ence transformed into an authoritative written account ... composed 
by an individual author?' (1983: 120) . Clifford reasonably notes, how­
ever I that , 
it is difficult to say very much about experience . .. if only because appeals 
to experience often act as validations for ethnographic authority . ... But 
this experiential world. an intersubjective ground for objective fonns of 
knowledge . is precisely what is missing or problematic for an ethnographer 
entering an alien culture . (1983: 128) 
It becomes necessary [0 conceive ethnography, not as the experience and 
interpretation of a circumscribed 'other' reality, but rather as a constructive 
negotiation involving at least two, and usually more, conscious, politically 
significant subjects. Paradigms of experience and interpretation are yielding 
to paradigms of discourse, of dialogue and polyphony. 
(1983 : 133) 
As far as they go, Clifford's criticisms are pertinent but are they as radical 
as is claimed? 
In spite of the brave attempt, Clifford's own text holds him back. 
Ethnographies are implicitly divided into genres; and their subject matter 
is assumed to be homogeneous. (J ncidentally , if ethnographies are complex 
and heterogeneous how would we establish that new ones would produce 
a truer account than existing ones?) Although Clifford briefly raises the 
question of the authorship of field notes and the role of the reader in 
realizing there to be more than the 'text's dominant voice' (1983: 136, 
141), he proceeds most of the time as if the text were a unitary object 
and the sole agent of the monograph the anthropologist. As a result he 
embraces an antediluvian model of agency which excludes the complex 
relations of which a work and its formal author are only part (see Burghart 
in this volume) . 'Text ' tends to be treated in a positivist manner as synony­
mous with the actual work (cf. Barthes 1979). This leads to him ignoring 
the difficult questions of how , and how far, such mutual knowledge comes 
about and of what it would consist. Interaction is assumed, teleolOgically, to 
be constructive (not , say, destructive , complex or under-determined) and to 
lead to shared communication , despite the case for coexistence effectively 
depending on substantial misunderstanding (Wallace 1961 : 29-44) and 
the serious problems of how 10 infer a conceptual scheme from action at all 
(Quine 1960: 26-79). 
Clifford's vision of anthropology as capturing the real polyphony of life 
leans heavily on Bakhtin's notion of 'heteroglossia' which is read not as 
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language or some suitably cautious expression, but as 'voice', which brings 
to mind Derrida's point that voice implies the intimate and immediate pres­
ence of experience and subjectiviry. Despite the supposed transition from 
experience to discourse, the theme of voices reappears continuaUy in the 
images of dialogue and polyphony. Voice somehow captures the realiry of 
personal experience. Fieldwork , we are told, rests on inter-subjectiviry but 
this simply begs the question of personal identity and shared subjectiviry in 
the first place. In other words , we seem to be faced with a very old fashioned 
idea of the self, not just as the sole kind of agent, but as an autonomous, 
'knowing subject' in Foucault 's sardonic phrase . This suspicion is borne 
out by the depiction of ethnography as a negotiation between conscious 
subjects which conjures up all sorts of utilitarian ghosts. Negotiation pre­
supposes not only an account qf intention , interests and self but also, as 
Durkheim observed long ago, a culturally variable language in which it is 
conducted (Hobart 1986) . After all this has been imposed on the unfortu­
nate Other-at once generalized in Its spurious specificiry and revocalized 
by superior agency-it is naive at best to inform them or the reader that 
they are now politically significant subjects. 
The textualists' own text tells us much more though. In the Introduction 
to Writing culture, the essays, we are told (paraphrasing Geertz 1973 : 15) 
focus on ' the constructed, artificial nature' of 'text making'. For ethnogra­
phy ' is always caught up in the invention, not the representation , of culture' . 
It is 'situated between powerful systems of meaning', 'at the boundaries of 
civilizations , cultures, classes' , and so on. So the essays 'reach beyond texts 
to contexts of power, resistance, institutional constraint' (Clifford 1986a: 
2) within which anthropological ideas are 'enmeshed' (1986a: 11) by 'stag­
ing dialogues' (1986a : 14) to reach the 'polyphony' of 'negotiated realities ' 
whereby the falsiry of 'monophonic authoriry' is 'revealed' (1986a: 15). 
Such 'post-modernism' is distinct in 'demanding new forms of inventiveness 
and subtlery' (1986a: 22-23), where 'divergent styles of writing are ... 
grappling with these new orders of complexity' (1986a: 13). 
The metaphors are striking. Texts are things made , as cultures are 
invented , by anthropologists. Power is conceived as force working against 
resistances and constraints. Meaning and culture, indeed knowledge itself, 
are bounded, concrete entities . The moving spirit in this solidified world 
is Mind through the instrument of language. Culture is revealed through 
language as authentic voices . As Clifford's allegories, more constitutive 
than deconstructive, run amuck he is left with a serious problem of agency .' 
On the one hand, ethnography depends on the genius of the ethnogra­
pher-better still the textualist who explains to him what he said-and 
realiry on the negotiating skill of the 'knowing subject' (shades of Utilitari­
anism's soft side-kick, Symbolic Interactionism). On the other, transeen­
dental agents take over as 'post-modernism demands' and 'sryles of writing 
grapple'. 
The promised post-modem revolution, overshadowed by the past , pales 
into an abortive rebellion . Perhaps we learn a bit about Clifford and his 
entourage but precious little about people in other cultures. Inspection sug­
gests that this exclusion is built into the approach. For the knowable world 
TheAuthorized Balinese 309 
is to be reached through contemporary Western categories , like allegory, 
genre and meaning, which hold good across cultures and historical periods. 
Otherwise Clifford would be obliged to consider both how ethnographers 
interpret informants and how he interprets their texts . J Inter-subjective 
experience conveniently rides to the rescue . For 'individuals collaborate to 
produce a specific domain of truth ' (1986b: 104). Unfortunately the subjec­
tivity looks uncomfortably like Clifford's own writ large,' The author of the 
ethnographic text has become still less a partial instrument than the agent 
who enables people in other cultures to speak and-the more the text 
assumes immediacy instead of the fieldwork-in a sense to exist. Paradoxi­
cally , purging the author's bias has culminated in the ethnographer being left 
to authorize and perpetuate the Other. Ethnography becomes the poisoned 
chalice of an elixir of immortaliry. 
The theoretical pretensions of the approach are perhaps best brought out 
by two other contributors. Tyler, with great aplomb, undertakes to tell us 
what post-modem ethnography should look like, blithely lumping anyone 
in sight under that label (1986: 125) from Lyotard to Habermas despite 
the latter's strenuous denials (1985). Previous scholars 'have missed the true 
import of Hdiscourse", which is '4the other as us". for the point of discourse 
is not how to make a better representation, but how to avoid representation' 
(1986: 128). Oh, good! Behind all the talk of polyphony, pluralism and 
so on , there is a true view and the textualists, or at least Tyler, have it. (If 
discourse has a true import , Tyler is backing the wrong horse in embracing 
post-modernism which is usually associated with aiming to challenge the 
possibility of such true knowledge.) The Other has now been absorbed into 
the superior language of the ethnographer (a danger of which Asad warned, 
1986: 156-60), made safe for democracy and, further , has become con­
flated with the self-centred and total ego of the anthropologist. 
Tyler sets out to undermine the delightfully simple-minded view that 
'the ethnographic text' represents reality . Meaning is to be found, not 
in representation, but instead in evocation (note once again the appeal 
to primal 'voice') which frees ethnography from 'mimesis', objects, facts , 
descriptions , and SO on (1986 : 130). Apart from pre-empting inquiry 
into indigenous notions and usage of reference (on which Balinese for 
instance are rather subtle), Tyler is flogging the long-dead horse of crude 
Correspondence Theory seemingly unaware that the argument passed him 
by some time ago (on his own countrymen alone, see Davidson 1973 ; 
Goodman 1981; Quine 1953, 1960) . The idea that the sole, let alone sim­
ple, function of language is to represent things is largely restricted , among 
the thinking classes , to die-hard Logical Positivists and Dan Sperber who, 
incidentally , took the same tack with evocation slightly less unsuccessfully 
(1975: 115-23). Goodman, for instance, pointed out that, even were we 
to try , we simply cannOI represent things as they are, rather we represent 
something as something else (1981 : 3-43; to which I would add 'to an 
audience on a particular occasion') . And Jakobson alone noted at least six 
non-exclusive functions of language (1960). Instead of meditating on 'the 
true import of discourse', perhaps we might ask how language is used by 
people in doing things in particular historical and cultural situations. 
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'For learned nonsense has a deeper sound 
Than easy sense, and goes for more profound .' 
(Samuel Butler, 'Upon the abuse of human learning') 
To the extent that Tyler is coherent, he unwittingly embraces most of the 
presuppositions behind the arguments he attacks. Why, for instance, should 
culture be about meaning? And why should we be offered a dichotomous 
choice between ethnography either evoking Or representing in the first 
place? The answers open a can of wonns. He assumes essential processes 
of understanding which constitute exclusive, indeed dichotomous , classes.' 
DOing away with representing would not dispose of the ontological problem 
of what it is that whoever it is js doing to what. One evokes something, 
however conceived, unle.s we are to imagine pure undirected eVOking, like 
pure emoting. (Would Tyler wish to argue that his critique of representa­
tion is itself purely evocative ?) In all this, the nature of the evoking self 
is treated as curiously unproblematic. Instead we are offered the Western 
mind reflecting on itself and its creations: 'post-modern ethnography is 
an Object of meditation' (1986 : 134). These are not quibbles because they 
point to confusions in the critical textual project quite beside the rampant 
essentialism, ontological myopia and assured egotism which the reader has , 
mercifully briefly, encountered above . 
The world Tyler is trying to enter has already been depicted by Baud­
rillard . It is a world of simulacra created by the knowing subject who in 
turn becomes a simulation. Simulation, unlike representation, starts 'from 
the radical negation of the sign as value ' (1983a: 11). If one follows this 
path, the image goes through successive phases: 
-it is the reflection of a basic reality 
-it masks and perverts a basic reality 
-it masks the absence of a basic reality 
-it bears no relation to any reality 
whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum . ... When the real is no longer what it 
used to be. nostalgia assumes its fuO meaning. There is a proliferation of myths 
of origin and signs of reality: of second-hand truth, objectivity and authentic­
ity . There is an escalation of the true. of the lived. experience; a resurrection 
of the figura[ive where [he object and substance have disappeared . 
(1983a : 11-12) 
Baudrillard has not just anticipated the cui-d.-sac into which Tyler, 
Clifford and Co. so gaily gallop, he offers a delightful caricature of the 
plight of such an anthropology which has to reinvent the Other ('Savages 
who are endebted to ethnology for still being Savages', 1983a : 15). For 
the logical evolution of a science is to distance itself ever further from its 
object until it dispenses with it entirely , 
(1983a : 14)' 
Whatever the aim, the effect is to write off other peoples, or only to 
allow them in by way of the superior language and knowledge of anthro­
pologists. That people might 'scandalously resist this imperative of rational 
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communication' in favour of spectacle , the play of signs or stereotypes 
(Baudrillard 1983b: 10), or whatever it might be, seems not to have 
dawned . The critical textualist venture is ultimately, in the phrase of that 
philosophe manque Anton Froge (1873: 37), 'autocephalopederastic' . 
Tyler's colleague Fischer conveniently brings up the rear. He recom­
mends us to ethnic autobiography with its 'insistence on a pluralist , multi­
dimensional, or multi-faceted concept of self' (1986: 196) . At first sight, 
one is tempted to endorse such an aim, but this amiable liberalism is 
not quite what it seems. Ethnic autobiography will reveal the concept 
of the self. Now, is the self a concept? And whose concept of self is it 
anyway ? The project makes sense only if the self in different contexts, 
classes and cultures is effectively commensurable and translatable . For this 
to be so the self (once again species as genus) must be essentialized out of 
its historic and cultural situations. Rellexivity here presupposes people are 
basically separated from their thoughts and actions. In assuming that the 
self is something on which it is culturally appropriate, and semantically 
possible, to wax lyric. Fischer is prescribing an ethnocentric cultural vision 
and the kind of hegemonic discourse he claims to reject. If Clifford is 
Brutus to a Geertzian Caesar's textual tyranny, Tyler and Fischer are his 
Cassiuses. 
Here we come to the nub . For this discourse consists of 'compulsions', 
'repressions' and the like which , when stripped away or resolved, lead to 
the 'revelation of cultural artifice' (1986: 231). We are back to an antic 
theory of individual and society in which the knowing subject at best attains 
his or her true individuality by shaking off the artificial shackles of culture. 
and at worst achieves a measure of emancipation by rellecting on its con­
ditions of enslavement. When Fischer urges 'the reader to self-consciously 
participate in the production of meaning' (1986: 232). meanings and 
producers are assumed to be at least partly commensurable. and self­
consciousness to be the criterion of true knowledge and personhood. The 
whole enterprise is underwritten by an amaurotic vision of a psychic unity 
of mankind which , On inspection . turns out to be that of a middle-class 
American academic.' Perhaps the reader may now grant that the image 
of the trussed-up native in someone else's spectacles is not so far from 
the mark . 
Critical textualists then run the risk of uncritically exemplifying many 
of the presuppositions they profess to purge . Whatever the trendy, iII­
understood vocabulary, the approach is deeply conservative and, like so 
much epistemology, loftily ignores its own political implications . Anthro­
pology is a convenient bolt-hole for those of timid liberal and pluralist 
persuasion who. after the event. can safely rail at colonial injustices-­
but manage to be SOlO voce about its equally otiose successor 'develop­
ment'. (One wonders . no doubt unfairly. whether textualism is not some­
times a useful let-out from all the rigours . untidiness and imperfection 
of fieldwork .) The loyal opposition may help what it claims to oppose . 
Certain brands of reftexive anthropology-in recreating other peoples, in 
authorizing their otherness, while empowering them only to exist in terms of 
their authors ' sense of self-seem to me subtly to perpetuate unacceptable 
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fonns of domination by underwriting the conditions which made this poss­
ible. We are invited to witness a conspiracy against oppression but are left 
with Neros fiddling while Rome bums. 
Hegemony and cryogeny 
Steering clear of the Charybdis of a regressive reflexivity is no excuse 
for leaping back into the gorges of the Scylla of naive realism. A study 
of regional traditions of ethnographic writing may promise an escape from 
ethnocentric generalization and enable one in theory to stand back and 
look at the circumstances in which certain ideas come to be accepted as 
typifying a particular area of the world (see Strathem in this volume) . 
There are two difficulties however. The first is a trap to which textualism 
is also prey. It may crudely be epitomized by the question of how much 
perceived variation is due to the emergence of a specific textual tradition 
and how much to real differences between regions? The second is whether 
one can trace an emergent tradition without constructing a genealogy which 
represents sectarian interests at the expense of views of people in other 
societies, subjects or schools. Focusing on the fanner obscures the ways in 
which commentary necessarily involves relations of power as much as does 
ethnographic writing. 
My objection is that to see ethnography in terms of an allelomorphic 
dichotomy of reality and textually-informed knowing subject is misguided. 
It rests on a dubious, and highly essentialized, vision of reality, knowledge 
and agency. In its baldest version it assumes a naive realism (facts are 
given), linked to a passive theory of knowledge based on a visual metaphor 
(truth will be perceived when distortions are removed, ct. Rorty 1980 : 
3-45). The facts and values of a culture, however heterogeneous and 
changing, are ultimately given. The problem becomes how best to cope 
with the distortions inevitably imposed by ethnography, whether these be 
inadequacies of circumstances, method, personality, intellectual or textual 
tradition, and so On. Reflexivity just adds to the burden of anthropologist 
as hero. The antithetical view, sometimes labelled idealist, that humans 
invent culture (Wagner 1981 ; and that ethnography is therefore construc­
tions of constructions) only shifts the emphasis from the world 'out there' 
to the world 'in there ' of the knowing subject. Juggling both views at once, 
whether by asserting both naturalism and cultural variability (Bloch 1977; 
Horton 1979), different perspectives on a single reality (Lukes 1982), or 
reality as negotiated between self-conscious subjects, merely compounds 
the confusion. In neither version is the nature of the reality or the problems 
in knowing considered seriously: the anthropologist is the agent, or 
instrument, of ethnography and the people at best the instruments, more 
often the patients, of his or her knowledge (see Crapanzano's comments on 
Geertz's Deep play, 1986: 70-76). Cultures emerge as separate entities , 
be these conceived in material. social or discursive terms, the relations 
between which may be phrased in terms of appropriating knowledge or 
of translation and interpretation. This vision is flawed, I submit, not only 
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because it assumeS a hierarchical relationship between ethnographers and 
ethnographed , but because it helps to bring such a situation about in fact 
and perpetuate the condition it assumes. In other words, texts become 
hegemonic and_ what I shall call, cryogenic. 
Approaches which leave reality and knowledge , history and culture in 
limbo . and treat issues of agency as unproblematic , are seriously at fault. 
For a start , they ignore the entire human history of contact , trade. 
domination and attempted subjugation or extinction , of which authoriza­
tion, and more recently ethnography, is but one facet. Peoples have been 
busy beating up, exploiting, ogling, ignoring and misunderstanding one 
another for a long time . Ethnography is a newcomer to a world of complex 
and confused past dialectical relationships. The facts reported by ethnogra­
phers do not exist in vacuo but are continually being reworked by agents, 
including ethnographers themselves, in particular cultural and historical 
situations. Knowledge, including that pernicious thing the ethnographer's 
self-consciousness. is not a passive process of realizing what is already there , 
but again a continued re-working on different occasions (even if academics 
sometimes have to run fast to stand still). In other words , the reality and the 
textual traditions which notionally might determine the 'content' of ethnog­
raphy are themselves the results of previous (and , more often than is usually 
allowed . mutual but not necessarily mutually comprehensible) acts, as is 
the knowledge and consciousness of both ethnographers and their subjects. 
Inden , writing about Orientalism, has raised a point which applies with 
equal force to anthropologists. For Western knowledge 
is privileged in relation to that of the Orientals and it invariably places itself 
in a relationship of intellectual dominance over that of the easterners. It has 
appropriated the power to represent the Oriental. to trans late and explain 
his (and her) thoughts and acts not only to Europeans and Americans but 
a/so to the Orientals themselves. But that is not all. Once his special knowl­
edge enabled the Orientalist and his countrymen to gain trade concessions. 
conquer , colonize. rule . and punish in the East. Now it authorizes the area 
studies specialist and his colleagues in government to aid and advise, develop 
and modernize . arm and stabilize the countries of the so-called Third World . 
I n many respects the intellectual activities of the Orienta/ist have even produced 
. the very Orient which it constructed in its discourse. 
(Inden 1986: 408; my emphases)' 
I would merely add that imposing our ideas of knowledge , self and 
reality are the more insidious, the more carefully they are wrapped up in 
libertarian pretensions . 
Against this background, textual criticism, regional or otherwise , attains 
a new significance. Although anthropologists spend much time writing 
about how genealogies underwrite claims to truth and power, they seem 
less sensitive , publicly at least, to their own efforts to do the same.' One 
could, for instance. write several different accounts of the growth of knowl­
edge about Indonesia. each perhaps illuminating in its own way but which 
rightly would give rise to complaints of skew, of re-presentation . (f there is 
nO neutral way to talk about the seminal works of an intellectual tradition 
which is not itself part of a political history, we are pitched into questions 
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of agency in the relationship of subjects, authors, texts and readers. What is 
seminal depends partly on what it spawns. So, rather than just add another 
premature contribution , it maybe worth briefly considering how some of the 
best known approaches to South East Asia depict their subjects, how far 
certain works attain the curious status of being definitive and how a textual 
tradition may become an agent in constituting ethnographic reality. 
The question of how South East Asia has been represented by the 
West would , and indeed already has, taken up several books (on recent 
anthropological work on Indonesia alone see Boon 1977, 1982; de Josselin 
de Jong 1983a, 1984 ; Koentjaraningrat, 1975; on how this has affected , 
or been used by, the peoples concerned, see the contributions to Hobart 
and Taylor 1986). As anthropologists are relative innocents in a field well 
worked over by archaeologists, historians and orientalists, the arguments 
over the nature and implications of a specifically South East Asian textual 
tradition, were it desirable, would be a substantial undertaking well beyond 
the scope of this paper. So instead I shall consider briefly whether there 
are (as Inden has argued for India, forthcoming) what might be regarded 
with hindsight as hegemonic texts which have established the terms of 
future discussion and which have, in a sense , helped to constitute South 
East Asian societies. While future research will, no doubt, reveal more 
influential sources (Conrad's novels?), for anthropological purposes I shall 
suggest there is a fascinating cryogenic trend which serves, accidentally or 
deliberately, to freeze South East Asian societies from changes which are 
depicted as modem and external. 
The way in which Western discourses affect their 'objects' is apparent in 
the notion of South East Asia itself. The term is a convenience born in the 
aftermath of the Second World War to cover the area including Thailand 
(then Siam) and the colonies of Dutch Indonesia, the Hispano-American 
Philippines, British Burma, Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Brunei, the White 
Rajas' Sarawak , and French Indo-China. Subsequently it has served various 
parties' interests, not least those of ASEAN (Association of South East 
Asian Nations), at times to represent themselves as having something in 
common. While historians have traced genealogies of kingship (from Java 
to Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand, although not under those names) 
within the region, in broader terms South East Asian societies have usually 
been regarded as peripheral to the twO Great Civilizations of India and 
China , as the composites Indo-China and Indonesia suggest. Their political 
marginality was long under-written by archaeological , historical and cultural 
evidence which portrayed local societies as passive recipients of apot-pourri 
of civilizing influences from their great neighbours which in turn were 
degenerate or stagnant dead ends in the evolution ofcivilization. Where one 
digs, and so what one finds, depends of course partly on what one is looking 
for. Despite this, recently the tables have turned , and archaeological and 
linguistic evidence is adduced in favour of South East Asia as the originary 
site of settlement, domestication of rice and other good things which are 
exported . No doubt matters will change again . ,. 
Whereas India and China seem to have been represented as, relatively 
speaking, unified, centralized and organized, the region in between was 
,... 
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portrayed as diversified , largely decentralized and disorganized . As Boon 
has pointed out (1986), the British colonial authors on Sumatera , Java and 
Bali alone (Marsden 1811; Raffles 1817; Crawfurd 1820) described. and in­
deed commended, these three adjaoent islands as potential models. as 'con­
troll able ' , 'monumental' and 'Kawified' (literally, Indianized) respectively . 
Another way this diversity is expressed is in an opposition between the cen­
tralized (Hindu-Buddhist) states of Java and Bali on the one hand and the 
local rulers (often mercantile Muslim) of small lowland areas and acepha­
lous swidden societies ofthe 'Outer Islands' on the other (a dichotomy given 
geographical flesh by Geertz 1963a)." Whether the former constituted 
far-flung empires or barely controlled the perimeters of their own capitals, 
depends on one's prior assumptions; as does whether the sources upon 
which rival interpretations are based are considered historical chronicles 
or not (e.g. Pigeaud 1960- 63; cf. Berg 1965). Even the adherents of 
a vision of dynastic splendour firmly place this in a long-lost past. So the 
purported subsequent disorganization and squalor make the past. and the 
necessity of a European managerial presence, appear desirable by contrast. 
Reflexive approaches tend to stresS the degree to which the meaning of a 
text is determined by the social and personal circumstances of the author . 
One might equally argue that such texts are important for the courses of 
action they anticipate. 
The themes of diversity and disorganization spread well beyond Indon­
esia. An example is Embree's famous characterization of Thai society 
(maybe by contrast to Japan where he worked before) as 'a loosely struc­
tured social system'. Here we learn that the Thai are ' individualistic' to the 
point of an 'almost determined lack of regularity, discipline and regulation' 
(1950: 182) , in which 'obligations are not allowed to burden one unduly' 
(1950: 184). This extreme individualism leads to 'permissiveness' which 
celebrates 'enjoyment not hard work ' and indeed 'to tell a lie successfully , to 
dupe someone else, is praiseworthy in Thai culture ' (1950: 191,190,186). 
Similar themes permeate Leach's Political systems of Highland Burma (al­
though I hardly think either would generally be considered to have wielded 
a hegemonic influence over subsequent regional ethnography) . Highland 
Burma certainly exemplifies several common trends in the literature . The . 
Kachin are incapable of efficient central organization and attempts invari­
ably collapse." And their appearance of stability or continuity is ritual or 
symbolic (see Gellner's critique, 1973). The extent of local variation invites 
recourse to a conjectural history of plural influences. So, what is culturally 
worthwhile is presumed to be largely borrowed or imported from outside 
(via the conveniently little-studied Shan from the Indian Great Tradition) 
and mechanically , if ineptly, imitated. Recognition of such promiscuity 
poses a threat however to determinate theories of social structure or 
culture. So a theory of human nature must be invoked to explain the 
resultant problematic relationship between individual behaviour and social 
rules or nonns. For the Kachin it is '3 conscious or unconscious wish to gain 
power' (1954: 10)." Where Leach and Embree disagree is over whether 
their respective peoples are driven by a desire to maximize their power or 
to indulge their desire for leisure and egoistiC autonomy. 
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How emergent academic traditions may directly affect their object of 
study is strikingly evident in the Netherlands. This was realized in the 
emergence of the University of Leiden as the centre for both Indonesian 
studies and for training colonial civil servants: scholars and administrators 
were often the same people in different stages. or aspects. of their lives (for 
details . see Koentjaraningrat's nice analysis. 1975). The potential overlap 
of interests is evident in the stress on adatrecht. Indonesian customary 
law . which elided inquiry into collective representations and the perceived 
needs of government. whether explicitly interventionist or not. Adatrecht 
was an extraordinary hybrid. not least because adat is an Arabic word 
(I ndonesians had to borrow. via Islam. the term by which their cultures 
were to be epitomized). It required the conjunction between law. broadly 
conceived, and supposedly general indigenous ideas of a pervasive cosmic 
harmony. So not only was inquiry into the nature of social processes 
effectively pre-empted both by the assumptions of the model and the 
developing dogma that Indonesia, beneath the differences. was a culture 
area (some of the earlier writings especially include glorious exceptions). 
but the reified structures came to be upheld by law and celebrated as 
distinctly Indonesian . In Bali for instance, apart from transmogrifying 
intricate networks of ties between princes. overseers and peasants into 
administrative villages or irrigation complexes, subtle regional differences 
in understanding of economic and pOlitical clientage and ranking became 
rigidified into monolithic systems of land tenure and caste . The twist in the 
tale is that adat is recognized in Indonesian law. SO culture reconstituted is 
now official. 
While mainland South East Asia tended to be conceived in terms of 
Grand Systems (usually Hinayana Buddhist) imitated by marginal minor­
ities and maritime South East Asia, a field unified in its diversity. two 
popular anthropological approaches to Indonesia reiterate presuppositions 
similar to those noted above. The first is the Leiden , and sometime Oxford, 
tradition of structuralism , which was dominant for a long time in the Neth­
erlands (and, as its proponents will soon tell one , predates Levi-Strauss, 
although it is distinguished by a greater focus on the empirical study of 
surface structures). The second is associated with the writings of Clifford 
Geertz. The former , under the guiding hand of the de Josselin de Jong 
lineage , constitutes an exclusive genealogy;" the latter reflects the prolix 
hermeneutic imagination of Clifford Geertz who. as it happens, is also the 
moribund father of the Oedipal textual analysts . Despite differences (see 
Geertz 1961), the two have more in common than either would allow. For 
example , Geertz in his analysis of the Balinese theatre state (1980) rediscov­
ers-for he does not cite-van Wouden 's Eastern Indonesian Divine King 
who is trapped by the passivity which underwrites his legitimacy (1935) . 
The similarities extend not only to their predominant concern with symbolic 
structures but even to their vision of human nature . 
At the risk of simplifying. to the Leiden School social structure in 
Indonesia is symbolic (hence the fragility of immanent organizations)." 
the endless borrowings and contingent features are structured according to 
a general cultural template (which unfortunately has many different forms 
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or emphases) at a level of abstraction such that it determines conceptual 
structures without having to explain, or even consider, divergences in actual 
behaviour. From its inception the Leiden School was heavily indebted to 
Durkheim (see de Josselin de Jong 1983b) and drew implicitly on his theory 
of human nature as mechanically reflecting collective representations , a 
position which they did not have to modify as much as all that when they 
decided to claim. in varying degree. Levi-Strauss as a collateral. 
Although Geertz has written about both Java and Bali . there are certain 
continuities behind the contrasts. If 'traditional institutions' still work in Bali 
(1959a : 34) . Java is perilously unstructured and disorganized . The imposi­
tion of foreign ideas and institutions. mainly through Dutch economic and 
administrative policies (1963a), have reduced villages to amorphous suburbs 
(ef. Jay 1969; Koentjaraningrat 1985 : 99-229)." while the burgeoning 
towns are at once shakily held together and divided by allegiance to different 
status groups. reincarnate as rival political parties (Geertz 1957, 1965) . The 
implication that things were in some kind of balance before the Dutch made 
it all go wrong not only fits ill with historians' portrayals of widespread 
strife and confusion (e.g. Ricklefs 1978), but also. dichotomously , equates 
corporate groups and formal organization with structure and their absence 
with chaos. The assumptions are illustrated by the problem the Javanese 
have had, according to Geertz, in achieving 'economic take-off' (i963b). 
By under-playing the degree to which Java was integrated into the Dutch 
economy and the subsequent strangle-hold of the Chinese on commercial 
capital , the impression is created of the Javanese as rude dolts, clowning 
their superiors but largely failing to grasp even the rudiments of modem 
business . rather than as the rural sector of a complex industrialized. and 
partly international , economy trying to gain entry into fiercely defended 
monopolies (ef. Dewey's subtler account . 1962). 
Geertz traces the complexity and internal political instability of Java 
to the co-existence of three ideal typical status groups which provided the 
nuclei of social structure (1960: 5) . Of these, the Santri (Muslim) and 
Priyayi (Hindu-Buddhist) models have been imported and coexist more 
or less easily with an indigenous Abangan tradition. which looks like the 
Little Tradition aping its Hindu elders and betters. Although he recognizes 
the significance of cultural borrowing, Geertz has had at times to engage in 
quite fancy footwork to dissociate Java and Bali from India. His theory of 
human nature requires it. For humans are essentially (sic) driven by the need 
to understand and make meaningful the world in which they live. They do 
so, however. in a curiously passive-indeed Durkheimian-way. Whether 
he is writing about religion in Java or the Balinese state, a description of col­
lective representations is implicitly regarded as the necessary and sufficient 
explanation of human actions. While. as Crapanzano has pointed out. the 
anthropologist is equipped , actively to search out and expand his world view 
and human understanding, the unfortunate natives of the East Indies must 
wait and suffer little meanings to come unto them. A dialectical theory of 
action would ill fit such a view. 
Geertz's work on Bali. by contrast. is predominantly concerned with 
exploring symbolism. SO reiterating the academic folklore which depicts 
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Java as the economic and political hub of Indonesia, and Bali as quaint 
and unlikely. (Perhaps because of its proximity and historical links, in 
some unstated manner Bali is paradoxically made to exemplify at once 
the idyllic beauty and Otherness of pre-conquest Java, and its potential 
violence and instability.) In a well-known article directly addressed to 
the problem of variation, Geertz seeks to explain variation in terms of a 
kaleidoscopic model of village institutions or 'planes of social organization', 
which may be mixed in different combinations like playing cards (1959b: 
991-92). (Later, he gives more stress to the dynamic implications of 
differences in styles of life between aristocrats and commoners, e.g. 1980.) 
The possibility of endogenous progressive change is effectively ruled out ab 
initio because these planes are 'fixed and invariant' (Geertz 1959b: 991). 
Geertz does not, however, clarify a significant ontological confusion over 
whether planes of organization are indigenous or analyst's constructs. The 
former reading would be in keeping with his general concern with local 
conceptual systems," but this would leave the unfortunate Balinese trapped 
inside a static conceptual model and seemingly unable to do much about 
changes in the world . (Two years earlier-in 1957-Geertz had proposed 
that the instabilities of Java were due to 'culture' lagging behind changes 
in 'structure' .) Organizational deficiencies in Bali are due to the system 
still working through traditional ties to achieve traditional goals (1963b). 
so external influences. for example national politics, are disruptive. Like 
giving a child a machine gun, they are excessively powerful tools with which 
to pursue petty local rivalries, as they are in the hands of people who are 
not yet equipped to handle them (1959a). 
In the vast literature on Bali a trend, so far more or less implicit, 
emerges clearly which one might label that of 'the cryogenic text'. In 
1925 Korn, one of the great Dutch scholars on Bali, for instance , wrote 
an article appositely in the Koloniaal Tijdschrift (Colonial Journal) with 
the arresting title'Bali is apart . .. is fijner bezenuwd dan eenig onder 
deel van lndie' ('Bali is a thing apart , [it] is more delicately strung than 
any other part of the Indies'). This was in fact only one in a long series 
of curious representations of the island which, as Boon has argued (1977: 
10-89), stretches back to Camelis de Houtman's retrospectively famous 
stop there in 1597. It continues in ever more numerous projects to 'rescue' 
Balinese culture-and sometimes the Balinese-from the depredations of 
tourists, Western economic and Indonesian political influences, if not from 
the Balinese themselves. which have been generated by the same vision 
of the Other as has the mission to save it '" Significantly, the imagery 
in which would-be, and self-appointed , saviours of Balinese culture depict 
its plight are invariably Western. Bali is a young virgin whom over-use will 
soon render an old whore ; Bali used to be a healthy body which is now 
falling prey to (variously pictured) diseases; Bali is feeble, passive Asia, 
unable to help itself, and must be rescued from the virile, adive West by 
virile, active Westerners. 
Although Bali may be a rather dramatic example, it introduces the 
broader theme of the extent to which anthropology requires the death of 
its object of study to exist as a subject. 
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For ethnography to live , its object must die. But the latter revenges itself by 
dying for having been 'discovered'. and defies by its death the science that 
wants to take hold of it. 
(Baudrillard 1983a: 13) 
The museological urge was clear in the excitement over the Tasaday who 
became 
the simulation model for all conceivable Indians before elhnography ... fro­
zen, cryogenized, sterilized, protected to death, they have become referential 
simulacra . and the science itself a pure simulation. 
(1983a: IS) 
We also apply this cryogenic urge to ourselves, he suggests. For 'our entire 
linear and accumulative culture would collapse if we could not stOCkpile the 
past in plain view' (I983a: 19). There is a trend towards appropriating 
a homogenized and re-constituted past (or perhaps how the world might 
have been ?). If Bali does not loom large in contemporary Indonesian 
self-images, the reasons are interesting. Nehru not least claimed it as 'the 
morning of the world', what it (and presumably India) had been like when 
still young. And why scholars, museum curators and tourists armed with 
cameras descend on Bali in hordes is intriguing." Culture, suitably reified, 
has become a commodity to be owned. 
Similar tendencies may be discerned in ethnographical accounts. Gellner, 
for instance, has charged Leach with hypostatizing the Kachin , as he 
assumes that change is explicable 
by specifying the contradictory ideals that are operating-which can be done 
through 'static' models employing 'static' concepts-thereby simultaneously 
indicating the mechanism of change and describing a changing society by 
means of two unchanging models. 
(1973 : 97) 
Behind this rests our old friend the Correspondence Theory of truth and 
meaning , according to which concepts somehow describe, or mirror, the 
world. As Geller points out, however, there is 'no such simple parallelism 
between concepts and things such as Leach seems to expect. ... The concept 
of "change", for instance, does not itself change yet it can "reflect" reality 
as much as the concept "stability'" (1973: 97). The difficulties stem from 
a kind of Idealism, the view that human action is ultimately explicable in 
terms of static, indeed frozen, cultural ideals (1973: 105-6), shared in 
different ways by Clifford Geertz and the Dutch structuralists. 
This cryogenic proclivity of viewing other peoples as victims of history 
or of their own passive natures and so in need of help is, I suspect, 
mare widespread and complex a phenomenon than has been realized. It 
is one which the epistemological vision of humanity outlined above tacitly 
encourages in either of its two main forms. To view Mind as reflecting on 
the natural or social world through the ideally transparent medium of lan­
guage is to overlook the problem of agency. Humans are construed in the 
image of their makers as passive observers and the instruments of, rather 
than participants in, transcendental agents from the Market, to History or 
Mind itself. Alternatively, to regard Mind as constructing or inventing the 
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world, merely introduces Mind-{)r here middle-class American minds-as 
the central agent to the exclusion of those who do the acting and thinking. 
It is a world without practice, where consciousness is aloof from the endless, 
and endlessly changing, mutual reworking of humans and culture. 
Adopting or rejecting such an approach is not just a matter of scholarly 
indulgence which matters little to the 'real world '. Cryogeny underwrites, 
in different ways, the latest exercise in Imperial domination, the need to 
'develop' others because, coming from static societies and unequipped with 
a Western dynamic individualism , they cannot do it for themselves. Now 
in itself it doesn 't really matter a hoot if academics are wildly wrong in 
imagining how the world is : in SO far as it is not governed by the abstract 
ruminations of epistemologists , the world will carry on regardless. It matters 
very much , however, if our ideas affect other people , let alone how we set 
about changing them, whether the consequences are foreseen or not. For 
people in other societies adopt , or have imposed on them, ideas and prac­
tices which implicate absurd , or even occasionally useful , theories which 
may come to be seen as legitimate and proper goals (see R. H . Taylor on 'the 
Burmese road to socialism', 1986 ; or Picard on tourism in Bali , 1986) ." 
If societies are not discrete entities, and their members passive pawns, but 
all related in a complex dialectic, might we then not learn something from 
others' usage? 
Not yet 
In the rest of this chapter I sketch out Balinese notions of action and 
agency and argue their bearing on an understanding of the self. These are 
sufficiently distinct as to vitiate the textualists' models among others and to 
give us reason to reflect on the adequacy of our own categories. The reason 
for concentrating on action is simply that Balinese often stress action in 
talking about human and trans-human affairs. First though, what kind of 
assumptions about knowledge, reality and agency would such an undertak­
ing require? Instead of ethnographers and natives realizing a meeting of 
minds in some briefly achieved epistemological arcadia, it helps to regard 
knowledge and the self as culturally and historically situated. Language is 
not the means to represent a potentially transparent reality, be this meta­
phorically portrayed as 'internal' or 'external', but it partly constitutes, and 
is itself reconstituted through, public usage. As Taylor has argued cogently, 
humans are not passive in this process. 
Perceiving the world involves not just the reception of infonnation, but 
crucially also o ur own conceptual activity, and we can know for certain the 
framework of empirical reality , because we ourselves provide it. 
(C. Taylor 1985b: 82) 
If social reality is not simply given but is something which is worked upon, 
so also 'the "mental" is not a primitive datum, but is rather something 
achieved ' (l985b: 90). Reflective 'awareness in our action is something 
we come to achieve . In achieving this, we also transform our activity' 
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(1985b : 84) . Nor is action, and so consciousness, necessarily individual. 
'All action is not in the last analysis of individuals; there are irreducibly 
collective actions' (1985b : 93) . Taylor is implying here something close to 
Collingwood's notion of a 'complex agent' consisting of humans, not just 
as agents but also as instruments in more elaborate and changing forms of 
collaboration (1942: 141-42) . Unlike such anthropological notions as 
corporate group or patron-elient ties however, which tend to imply some 
perduring essential entity or idea, such complex agents constantly rework, 
and even redefine, themselves (and are directly or indirectly subject to 
the activities of other agents) on particular occasions in particular cir­
cumstances . So knowledge, including self-knowledge, is active, dialectical, 
cumulative and situated . 
In this view, real ity is not simply lumpen-matter. 'Appearance and reality, 
the subjective and objective, are at once both opposed (i.e. different) and 
also united .' For 'consciousness and knowledge are not simply static states, 
but rather active processes' in which 'knowledge is the process of the trans­
formation of reality into thought' (Sayers 1985: IS, 16). This approach 
has several advantages . It avoids unnecessary essentialized dichotomies in 
favour of a logic of overlapping classes (Collingwood 1933: 26-53), as 
well as the epistemological traps which privilege academics as the closest 
thing we have ever come to pure understanding; and it opens the way to 
studying how agents in different cultural settings rework their knowledge 
and experience of, and so , the world in which they and others live. 
The stereotype of the Balinese as sybaritically sating themselves on a 
surfeit of symbolism underplays the importance of agency. The drawbacks 
of ideal models come out in cosmological representations of Divinity. It is 
possible to extrapolate different versions. For example, Divinity is spoken 
of as Ida Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa . In Old Javanese usage, the language 
of much Balinese literature and philosophy , widhi connotes 'rule, law 
ordering, regulation' and the verb form 'to command, order'. WaSa is 
'power, force, dominion' ; and widhiwaSa ' the power of fate or destiny' 
(Zoetmulder 1982: 2262-63, 2213-14). So Divinity appears at once 
as order, what orders, the power of order(s) or of fate . By ignoring the 
question of who makes such claims and in what situations, it is possible 
to regard priests and kings as immanently both the patients (in the sense 
of being the subjects or recipients of Divine ordinances) and the agents of 
order and orders to those under their command, rather as village patrons 
may appear as agents to their followers but as instruments to their superiors. 
Another model of Divinity is at odds with this ordered vision . It empha­
sizes the unstable competition popularly described as 'magic' (pangiwa, 
pangenen), 'witchcraft' (ngateyak , significantly Balinese use verb forms not 
abstract nouns) or 'mystical power' (kasaktian) where chance, contingency 
and fate are central. The world is portrayed as war, where potentially 
commensurable protagonists struggle perpetually, and over which Divinity, 
perhaps most commonly in its aspect as Siwa, presides by sheer superior 
ability. Finally, Divinity is also referred to as Ida Sang Hyang Sepi. As 
sepi is silence, stillness , absence, agency seems de-emphasized but , even 
in so idealized an account, the reading is probably ethnocentric because 
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stillness is arguably both the precondition of action and action in its most 
consummate form . 
At times, I confess. I too am tempted to succumb to the pleasure of 
playing with world views . They bear precious little relation , however, to 
the references to Divinity in whatever guise in different genres of writing 
(see Vickers 1986), far less to how Balinese talk about and act on such 
matters when occasion requires. The trouble comes from assuming an 
essence , revealing which will somehow explain how and why things are as 
they are. It may be the essential properties of the world or. more relevant 
in this instance, our constructs (quite possibly the same thing. Goodman 
1972: 24-31) or an authorial intention which imbues the vision with 
meaning. The stress on text and its meaning, exemplified differently by 
both Geertz and the textualists, simplifies and hypostatizes the relationship 
between author, audience . referent , theme . text , language and tradition. 
(The antithetical Utilitarian view of culture as the rusty blunderbuss of 
legitimacy to scatter opponents as calculation calls , is merely a variation on 
the theme .) By contrast Balinese texts leave much to the reader , literally in 
so far as works are often read aloud (ngawacen) and translated (ngartiang) 
to an audience which makes it unwise to try to infer an essential meaning a 
priori. Texts are produced and reproduced by complex agents from courts, 
priestly circles and sects to other interest groups. where the author may be as 
much instrument as agent and the text's significance is reached contextually. 
To return to my example , Divinity is differently instantiated by variously 
constituted agents in diverse silllations (Hobart forthcoming) . 
In daily life Balinese make use of a rich vocabulary of social action . 
Among the commonest expressions for customary ways of doing things is 
lala krama; and to participate in the activities of local corporate groups is 
makrama. While lala is used to speak of order in the sense of fixed rules or 
proper arrangement, krama is awkward . On different occasions it signifies 
'customary or fixed behaviour', ' conduct ' , ' the rules according to which 
something happens' , 'order'. 'succession': but also 'the facts of an event' 
and 'someone's way of doing something' as well as those who engage in the 
behaviour or are responsible for ordered behaviour." At once it implies 
action, proper action and people who (are expected to) act in a particular 
way . As we shall see the link of action, appropriate action and agency is a 
recurrent theme. 
There are other terms . The expression for doing something on the 
command of a prince or as part of one's duty to a group is ngayah and may 
range from manual or ritual labour to bearing arms . In Old Javanese, on 
which Balinese draws heavily, aya (h) is glossed as 'effort, endeavour, the 
course of action for effecting something' , and as a verb connotes ' to make an 
effort , to do one's best' (Zoetmulder 1983: 174). (Taking part in such work 
is makrama.) Significantly the term for activity or work of this kind, karya, is 
not simply what ought to be done . nor even what is feasible and fitting (on 
the implications of kiirya in Sanskrit and Old Javanese, see Moner-Williams 
1899: 276; Zoetmulder 1982: 813- 14). It is gerundive: it is both what 
is to be done and what is liable to be done in the nature of things. 
The usage is not without its parallels in English. 'Active' does not just 
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mean rushing about, but also being prone to action, not unlike Balinese 
volcanoes and gods. Passive, likewise, is not simply sitting still but accepting 
or receiving, for better or for worse, the decisions and actions of others. 
One should recall that 'passionate' means 'prone to anger', 'dominated by 
intense or impassioned feeling ' (Onions 1966 : 656; O .E.D . p. 534). The 
ambiguity inherent in many expressions for action (consider 'to pursue 
one's interests ') was anticipated by Collingwood who stressed the analytical 
importance of overlapping , rather than exclusive, classes (1933 : 26- 53) . 
Agents may be part instruments or patients of actions according to the situa­
tion or different points of view. (Is a Balinese priest making holy water the 
agent or the instrument of Divinity ? What of the king who commands his 
troops to battle but becomes the victim of the enemy?) So it may be useful 
to speak of silllations , persons, ideas, even actions as agentive, as requiring 
or inviting action and the emergence of an agent. Patients do not just suffer, 
they help to create a context in which action is implied, anticipated, invited 
or demanded ." If Balinese usage allows a link between necessary or antici­
pated action and humans or groups as agents or instruments to prefigured 
ends, we would be unwise to dismiss this as pre logical or as proof of mystical 
ideas of time and causation. 
This discussion may illuminate a striking feature of expressions in Balin­
ese and other Indonesian languages for what we call future action . If one 
asks if something is the case, or if someone has done something (for 
instance, whether it is the rainy season or whether someone has ever visited 
a particular place), the answer, largely regardless of the likelihood of it 
happening, is commonly not 'no' but 'not yet' (durung, Ion den in high and 
low Balinese respectively , be/um in Indonesian and Malay). While a fuller 
analysis is obviously required of the circumstances in which such replies are 
elicited, the usage is quite consonant with Balinese ideas that the future is 
anticipated, but not determined, in various ways by what is already the 
case. They have a subtle sense of the cultural obligations which constitute 
being human and of being situated, so to speak, in history. Consider , by 
contrast, the difficulties most contemporary Europeans have in conceiving 
of the self as diverse processes (ef. Parfit 1971) or of the future as portrayed 
in space-time phYSics. 
To return to action, different kinds of being engage in different typical 
behaviour. Birds fiy, snakes crawl and so on; but plants also grow in dif­
ferent ways and one has only to sit for a time to observe that rice fields too 
have their own peculiar activity . The term for the ways in which different 
forms of life exhibit their nature or predispositions is ma/aksana. Laksana 
may roughly be glossed as 'behaviour' or ' action' , but ma/aksana implies 
'a distinctive way of being or acting' by which it is known ." In Sanskrit 
/aksafJa has the sense of a 'mark, sign, symbol' which is relevant because it 
has a direct bearing on how it is used by Balinese. Different kinds of being 
are knowable from what they do or how they are . It is what makes them 
recognizable. 
This is not all. Among the other senses of /aksa')a are 'cause, occasion, 
opportunity'. It should be clear why these are not such strange members of 
a semantic set to do with action , any more than are 'name, form, kind' (see 
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Zoetmulder 1982: 958) . The result is that action or causation cannot be 
totally separated from meaning : the categories overlap. The characteristic 
behaviour of something is a sign of what it is; just as signs equally may be 
agents, or agentive. Balinese language of action is a far cry from the social 
scientists' favourite dichotomies of actor and action, Naturwissenschaften 
and Geisteswissenschaften, cause and reason, but it is none the poorer 
for that. 
Who do you think you are?" 
Can Balinese ideas about persons and suchlike beings throw light on 
problems about the self outlined earlier or on issues of agency? To 
consider how they may, I contrast some Balinese representations with what 
is inevitably something of a parody of common Western presuppositions 
about the self. Then I turn to what that hardy anthropological perennial, 
'ancestor won>hip', might tell us about knowledge and memory as actions. 
It is striking how often contemporary Western notions of personal iden­
tity are couched in spatial metaphors. Persons are not only construed as 
in-dividual , in-divisible (Marriott 1976: 109-14), but human experience 
is spoken of as split into an external world upon which an interior self, Or 
mind, reflects. For 
the development of the modem subject/person involves the unification of 
these spaces-without which the modem conception of a unified personaliry 
may no t be possible-and then interiorization . .. the space of disclosure is 
considered to be inside, in the 'mind', ... By space of disclosure, I mean the 
locus where things emerge at their fullest, clearest, most sa lient. 
(Taylor 1985a: 277) 
We speak so often of persons as substantive and unitary in space that it 
becomes hard to focus on the many situations in professional and daily life 
when we treat humans as in some sense dispersed. An alternative view of 
the self as subject to disparate forces is perhaps expressed in the popular 
enthusiasm for health foods, bio-rhythms, ions, astrology and the like. If 
humans are not independent closed atoms , neither are they necessarily per­
fectly integrated systems. (Why the Utilitarian view of humans as 'pre-social 
atoms ' will not work , is discussed well by Hollis, 1985 : 225-32.) Such 
awkward thoughts may, however, be tidied away without too much fuss 
somewhere in the dichotomies of inside and outside, mind and the world . 
This raises the question of how the self is implicated in the world. The 
accounts of South East Asians outlined earlier simply required humans to 
participate in culture or ideas or, perhaps more accurately, for culture and 
ideas to participate in them. So pen>ons are the instruments through which 
ideas or meanings work themselves out. (One could substitute 'the Market ' 
for ' ideas' in present-day British political discourse.) In speaking of our­
selves though, the agent of the self, Or the self as agent , is often mind and 
its working expressed as control. We control our feelings , our bodies, other 
people_ the environment and so forth . The notion of 'control', however, 
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is a vital extension of the mechanical, epistemological view I have been 
questioning. Not only the world , but people and even oneself, become 
objects for observation and constraint. 
Another way in which people may act, which neither falsely reifies them 
nor reduces them to objects, is evident in the idea of 'command' . Something 
of the difference may be illustrated by some simple English sentences. The 
degree to which control involves hidden spatial and material metaphors 
comes out in 'Control yourself!' The stress is on constraint , as opposed to 
'Command youn>elf!' which , as it stands , is nonsense until one indicates 
the activity in question. Whereas 'Control your dog!' implies one is dealing 
with a world of objects (cf. 'Control your car!'), 'Command your dog to 
do such-and-such!' recognizes the existence of agents or instruments partly 
independent of oneself. How though would the following expression fit? 
'She has a fine command of Balinese.' This situates the speaker in a cultural, 
linguistic and actual context and, in so far as fluency implies working with 
a complex medium not engineering it at will, suggests that language is 
more than a neutral instrument, with predispositions of its own. 'She has a 
fine control of Balinese' , if it makes sense at all, suggests Balinese people 
are somehow puppets of a superior authority. To anticipate the discussion 
for a moment , Balinese has plenty of words for command, but the nearest 
equivalents which come to mind for 'control'-sida ' to succed in ', sanggup 
' to be willing to take responsibility, capable' , wenang 'to give permission or 
power'-alilean in implication towards 'command' anyway. 
Without wishing to make too much of it, I suspect the images of control 
and command imply quite different views of the relations of minds, agents 
and actions. This view of command over a dispen>ed self can easily be 
read into a Freudian interpretation of mind. While one may choose to 
regard the 'super-ego' as an internal mental state, mechanism or process , 
one might equally treat it as experience or memories of parents, authority 
and genealogy in the broadest sense . As such it is the point of aniculation 
of the dispersed field of the social and the pen>Onal: just as the 'id' 
aniculates the person with animality and nature. Were humans not to 
participate in these transcendental agents, thought , communication and 
action would be impossible. Although it is heretical, one could argue 
that the aim of psycho-analysis is to convert a relation of control, the 
holding-back , the objectification of parts of oneself, the treatment of 
feelings as constrainable things , into one of command. The self becomes 
experienceable as a plurality of panly autonomous aspects, each allowed 
a measure of independence but now under one's authority or , better, 
will. While one cannot draw strict parallels, the image is reminiscent 
of accounts of Balinese kings who did not control soldiers as if they 
were tanks or machinery, but as autonomous agents who required coor­
dination (e.g. Vickers fonhcoming). Self-control may be the poor cousin 
of self-command. This does not mean , however, that objectifying oneself 
may not be a cultural goal. Inden has suggested that Bengali Brahmans 
may have developed a tradition of doing precisely this ." There is some 
evidence that Balinese high priests do something similar but, by contrast 
to what I unden>tand of cenain Indian ideals, Balinese appear widely to 
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stress the necessity of allowing a balance between alternative personal 
dispositions. 
This brings us conveniently to the Balinese. Prima facie many of their rep­
resentations seem largely to avoid imputing substance, atomism, unitariness 
or harmony to human nature. Among the ways humans are constituted are 
the triwarga, triguna and tiga-jiiana. The triwarga, the goals or motives for 
action (darma, good; artha, wealth or utility; kama, pleasure), mix in 
degree in explaining most actions. The tiga-jnana, energy (bayu), speech 
(sabda) and thought (idep) are not essences but are closer to abilities. 
capacities or potentialities. (The contrast with Aristotle's division of plants, 
animals and humans by the cumulative essences-or souls, psyche-of 
nourishment, perception and thought or reason should make the differences 
clear , Aristotle 1941: 556-62 ; 413b-15b). Such potentialities differ 
in degree and kind over lime among different beings : the speech of gods. 
princes and the village thief is often distinct. As contradictory Or incom­
mensurable tendencies are inherent to each scheme. humans are not simple 
unitary isolates in a Great Chain of Being. 
The distinctions have a complicated history of use which is traceable 
through Old Javanese to Sanskrit. One must beware, however, of false 
essential continuities. In Bali, the triguna, as dispositions, might loosely 
be glossed as knowledge or purity, sattwa; passion, activity, raja(h); 
and desire or ignorance, tamas (Zoetmulder 1982: 1713, 1482. 1914; cf. 
Monier-Williams 1899: 1135, 863, 438) . However, the terms are by no 
means restricted to humans but are ways in which the cosmos, understood as 
living processes. changes and are perhaps closer to 'existence' ('presence'). 
'activity' and 'darkness' respectively (see Inden 1985: 144-48). So when 
Balinese speak of the state of the self-b(h)uwana alit-as related in some 
way to the universe-b(h)uwana agung-it neither necessarily implies a 
displacement of responSibility for , nor a projection of, one's own actions , 
but a recognition of overlap, dispersal and the complexity of agency and 
patiency. Contrariety and change are built in. Nor do the schemes depict 
unchanging essences of human nature, but rather possible ways in which 
goals, capacities and predispositions combine. clash and work themselves 
out, or humans learn to command them. 
People are also popularly constituted in other, non-coordinate ways. 
According to a theory of humours the environment impinges directly on 
people. Extremes of cold (gesit), and worse heat (panes), are dangerous, 
the default condition is in-between (dumalada) and the ideal, coolness 
(etis). The weather, what one has eaten and all sorts of other factors affect 
one's being or cause illness and discomfort . So remedial 'ritual' or medical 
care may be needed to redress the balance. If there is too much water in 
one's body for example, marasa nyem, one has an uncomfortable feeling 
of heaviness, best relieved by something which makes one sweat. Rasa is 
widely used of what one experiences as within the body. Humans feel the 
world through the five senses (ngarasaang sakala antuk panca indriya), but 
may also internally feel such states as being disturbed by something (meweh) 
or polluted (leteh). The self is an intricate field. 
In some accounts feelings are localized. Balinese often link some of what 
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we might call strong emotions to the (ulun) ali, the (tip of the) liver, or 
stomach (basang); so one may complain of marasa lek ati, feeling ashamed 
or gedeg basang. angry. When speaking carefully though, people mOre often 
referred to gedeg keneh. Keneh is opposed to pemineh as desire-based 
thought is to opinion or detached judgement (and is mediated by manah 
which one might loosely render here as mind, will, or inclination). The dis­
tinction is parallel to the opposition of tamas and sattwa. Balinese recognize 
the complex relationship between such processes and action (Vickers forth­
coming). Apart from being the preconditions to action, thought or feeling 
may be the patient of someone else's actions, for example in making One 
angry. It may also be passion as when an attractive woman incites desire. 
All sorts of other influences are often held to affect humans, especially 
when things go wrong. Date of birth, where one lives, what one does, 
caste or descent group affiliation all help to make up the kind of person 
one is and the misfortunes to which one is subject." More or less unitary 
invisible agents from deities, ancestors and fate (ganti) to the qualities of 
particular days are also held to affect the living and their actions . These 
work on Balinese as patients, not mere objects. So ignorance of duwasa 
(appropriate days for different kinds of activity) or particular deities is as 
likely to leave one unable to utilize their potential as it is directly to lead to 
harm. Balinese disquisitions on the relation between the senses, feelings 
and mind and the world are, of course, far more elaborate than I can deal 
with here, a point which further underwrites the inanity of sweeping a priori 
assertions. 
Knowledge and memory as action 
Anthropologists sometimes depict peoples who regard the world as directly 
affecting them as pre-Copernican (e .g. Douglas 1966: SO). So it may be 
instructive to consider the language Balinese use to discuss an important 
class of beings whom they hold to affect their lives in all sorts of ways, 
namely the dead . In shunting the relations of living and dead away into 
categories like ' ancestor worship', anthropologists impose their own pre­
sumptions about the nature of being and action in such a way as to make 
themselves look intelligent at the expense of both understanding and other 
peoples. 
'Ancestor' is a very poor gloss of the Balinese. The term most commonly 
used is lalu(h)ur from lu(h)ur, 'above', 'superior'; the latter making better 
sense than 'ancestor'. (In tourist brochures gods and ancestors are always up 
in an empyrean heaven whence they descend. In fact their nature and locus 
is problematic, see J. Hooykaas 1955, 1956.) When humans die , funerary 
rites are required to transform them from incomplete presences, pirata, to 
their new state of being as pitara (both variations on the Sanskrit pit,) who 
are also referred to more elegantly as b(h)atara, a generic respect term for 
aspects of Divinity, which suggests 'lord' but also 'protector'. At any stage 
though, the dead may affect the living for good or ill . When misfortunes 
fall upon a household, sooner or later its members nocmally resort to spirit 
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mediums to inquire the source. Mediums use idiosyncratic aetiologies, but 
most attribute certain kinds of trouble to the dead, acting with anthro­
pomorphic motivation, generally for failure to carry out rites for their 
well-being properly. For example, the doyenne of local mediums diagnosed 
'ancestors' (variously described) as the sale or initial source of trouble in 21 
out of 62 cases studied. The sigos of displeasure included inter alia fonns of 
sickness (from headaches to jaundice) and general disorder (buwut), when 
'Wung, sing masare, magae', nothing goes right, one lands in debt, work 
is fruitless and relaxation impossible. On these occasions the dead were 
said to have been reminded (kaelingang) of neglect and their descendants 
judged and found at fault (kasisipang). So they were punished (kapongor 
or kapintelin) by being sent illness (katimpurang) or by witches and other 
destructive forces being let loose (kaMbang) . Less often the dead would 
indicate through the medium thit they were pleased to be remembered and 
were keeping an eye on (nyingakin) the living (and preventing. make/aatan, 
such dangers). 
The choice of tenns for involvement of the dead, drawn from a rich 
vocabulary of crime and punishment, contains significant ambiguities . For 
a start, the dead are often described using the passive fonn ka-, rather 
than the active ma-, or ng- prefixes. The root pongor, for instance, is used 
of 'falling into disgrace' and kapongor ' to be punished' by kings or gods. 
Either way, one anticipates the other (depending on whether disgrace 
antecedes or succeeds the punishment). The verb suggests 'causing to'," 
so the victim is the agent, if by inadversion, of the consequence. Likewise, 
kapintelin is 'to be pinched' by someone and also, according to my Balinese 
sources, implies 'having given someone reason to be angry'. The riposte is 
not so much inevitable or apppropriate as gerundive: it is punishable, or 
destined to be punished . 
A little reflection on the words Balinese use develops the theme: pinte/ is 
also ' to fall short' and has connotations of cheating or twisting, to renege on 
or disavow. Sisip is an equally curious word . It implies 'grazed, or obliquely 
struck (as by an arrow, or other weapon)' , 'mistake' , 'apology', 'wrong, 
or beside the mark' and , significantly, ' unable to reply' and so reduced to 
passivity. Its synonym in ancestral affairs, beda, as ngarebMa (ngarubeda), 
was used of disturbing someone's thoughts and feelings, a word often said 
of children tormenting adults which suggests the capacity of the weak to 
disturb the strong. (Ancestors, incidentally, are widely supposed to be 
reborn as children.) Again ambMa is an unwillingness to speak. Finally , 
the obliqueness indicated by sisip is echoed by timpur, nimpurin is 'to 
infuse with ' and katimpuran 'to be infused by' (illness, misfortune). Taken 
as a whole , the tenns for ancestral activity are remarkably indirect. The 
obliquity leaves it suggestively unclear who disavows or troubles whom , who 
is agent and who patient. It is not coincidental that descriptions of ancestral 
concern are so often couched in the passive. For omission is gerundive: 
it anticipates punishment. As 'errare humanum est', neglect by the living is 
agentive. It forces the ancestors to act or, perhaps better, ancestral wrath 
is the instrument of the victims' (in)action. 
So far we have not yet touched on possibly the most important pair 
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of termS: forgetting and remembering. Lali (engsap in low Balinese) 
is to forget or igoore . Now something of its sense may be appreciated 
by considering its antonym , to remember, eling (inget in low) , which is 
widely synonymous with being conscious. Remembering and forgetting, in 
contrasting ways, are vital preconditions of action. It is not just that when 
human neglect is recalled (kaetingang) by the ancestors they take steps; 
or when humans remember what is required of them all is likely to be 
reasonably well. Memory and consciousness (or, for that matter, forgetting) 
are not passive faculties, they shape the pattern of agency. Humans are not 
the helpless victims of bloody-minded ghosts; rather they take part in the 
process of recreating the dead, who are patients slowly being transfonned 
back into agents, through remembering them. This bears in a different way 
on the active Or passive involvement of ancestors with the living. Where the 
living go beyond the nonnal course of duty in remembering the dead , the 
dead are enabled to respond by energetically helping their kin. (One man 
in a village where I worked was well known for his assiduous devotion to his 
old grandmother. After she died he became very rich which was often said 
to be due to her unusually active help.) Inaction, similarly, brings about a 
passive response : the dead are reminded , kaelingang, that the living have 
not remembered . 
Much of the discussion about remembering holds true for Balinese ways 
of talking about knowing. They seem to put far less emphasis than we on 
learning as the active process, knowing as the steady state thereafter, and 
memory as its atrophy. In many contexts, all are treated as different kinds 
of action, as indeed are their associated activities. Seeing, for instance, as my 
phrase about the dead 'keeping an eye on ' the living was intended to suggest, 
involves active participation: few important events can take place without 
a witness." A witness is not a passive spectator but an agent who makes 
the event part of recorded happening. There is a stress on the way such 
actions continually reconstitute the person and, to the degree that agents 
are dispersed, affect others. The stripped identity, 'the soul ', alma, which 
is said to experience the after-world, is incapable of speech or action: it 
just suffers as it is the ultimate patient. 
This necessarily simplistic overview makes me wonder whether the per­
during glories of ethnography are all they are cracked up to be. Most 
approaches to South East Asia torture what they do not discard altogether 
into largely useless caricatures on the Procrustean bed of academic essen­
tialism. The standing joke about the infonnant who rushes home to look up 
an awkward question in an earlier ethnography, epitomizes the risk of these 
accounts becoming cryogenic and self-fulfilling by people whose claim to be 
prophets in anybody's land is dubious . If regional traditions tell us anything, 
perhaps it is that we need to work from what we have towards a new kind 
of ethnography, one which is less ethnocentric and more sensitive to the 
labile nuances of a complex world . Sadly it is not provided by the critical 
textualists. 
As peoples will presumably continue to portray , exploit , 'develop', subjug­
ate or kill one another off, a fonnal conclusion hardly seems appropriate. 
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Reflection on how we write about all this summons up banished spectres not 
just of what we include in our accounts and what we exclude, or are excluded 
from observing, but also of the implications of our descriptions for others 
and ourselves. There are several aspects to this. We tend to recreate the 
world in Our image, if not require others to do so. This process sometimes 
works in complex ways: it is not only contemporary Europeans who 
re-enact the work of an Elizabethan Englishman who made a (supposedly) 
black man express the ethnographical dream of the Other: 
'And of tbe Cannibals that each other eat , 
The Anthropophagi, and men whose heads 
Do grow beneath their shoulders.' 
(Othello I, iii) 
If our depictions are loaded acts, on what authority do we make them? 
Whether anthropologistS-:-who often exaggerate the importance of their 
puny loyal opposition to the big guns ofeconomics and political science-are 
the concerned pluralists and moral liberals they claim is a moot point, as a 
critical look at the textual critics makes clear. On the home front , 1 have 
my doubts both about this and about whether there are many situations 
where the subject or its practitioners constitute a unitary agent in any useful 
sense. Talk of grand, or regional , anthropological traditions is more about 
creating autolatrous genealogies than many would admit and the point of 
the exercise easily becomes forgotten . As anthropologists' representations 
of other peoples have helped in their own small way to condemn them to 
the fate of the Nubian , perhaps we should recall the remark of that familiar 
ancient: 
'The Moor is of a free and open nature 
That thinks men honest that but seem to be so, 
And will as tenderly be led by th' nose 
As asses are. ' 
(Othello I, iii) 
Fortunately , I am reliably informed, it is often the ass which wins. 
MARK HOBART 
Notes 
J . Clifford and G. E. Marcus (eds.) 1986. Writing culture: the poetics and 
politics ofethnography. University of California Press, London. 
2 Clifford finnly impales himself on the false dichotomy between society and the 
individual, language and speech . structure and individual creativity. Consider, 
for instance , the difficulties he encounters in squaring the subjective nature of 
meaning and truth (humans produce meaning, 1986b : 106) and the independ­
ent existence of the text which must be saved from becoming the source from 
which endless meanings may disseminate, as this would destroy the project by 
decentering its essential objects, the experiencing author and the ethnographic 
text itself. Accordingly he has to prevent attempts to 'deconstruct' the text 
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(here by De Man 1979, follOwing Derrida), and meanings from proHferating, 
by asserting that 'structures of meaning are historica1ly produced and coercive. 
In practice there is no "free play'" (1986b: 110). We are left with a surfeit of 
agents: humans produce meaning and truth, history produces meaning, and 
meaning is coercive . 
3 For instance Margaret Mead and George Eliot are cited as both being enticed by 
a pastoral allegory (1986b: 114, 109) which makes sense if one posits meaning 
as a perduring essence, but hardly if it is historically and contextually situated. 
If anyone is neo-pastoralist, it may be the textualists themselves. 
4 Commenting on Shostak's comments on her informant's comments on her life , 
Clifford remarks that here 'the hum of unmarked, impersonal existence can be 
heard' (1986b: 106). At the end of the book we are told 'the transfonning 
relationship ends with an equality in affection and respect' (1986b: 107). Now , 
to whom in each case is this so? Short of a remarkable confluence of ideas or 
of crediting Shostak's informant, or !Kung culture with having anticipated (or 
having imposed upon them) contemporary American intel1ectual fashions, one 
must conclude alJ this has precious little to do with the unfortunate !Kung. 
5 These , despite the airy gesture to power and history common to many lex­
tualists, are treated as ahistorical . asocial and unsituated. Otherwise. talk of 
'evocation' cross-(;uhurally in vitreo is meaningless. The project , as he makes 
abundantly plain , is to promote treating 'the other as us', and eliminate anyone, 
especially the Other, from exploring the divergent possibilities of discourse . 
The enthusiastic essentialism is made apparent by Tyler representing (sic) 
all ethnographic writings as instantiations of a generic 'text' which presumes 
every text to share the essential characteristics of the genus, as opposed say to 
ethnography being a way of reading disparate materials. 
6 	 Although elsewhere Baudrillard's target is sociology, his remarks on the 
creation of simulations are not irrelevant . 
That the silent majority (or the masses) is an imaginary referent does 
not mean they don't exist. It means that their representation is no longer 
possible. The masses are no longer a referent because they no longer belong 
to the order of representation. They don't express themselves , they are 
surveyed, They don't reflect upon themselves , they are tested , , . Now 
polls. tests, the referendum, media are devices which no longer belong to 
a dimension of representations, but to one of simulation. They no longer 
have a refere"nt in view, but a model. 
(1983b: 20) 
Here actual people in other societies have been replaced by the reflexive 
anthropologists' models. 
7 	 A good critique of the dominant view of self as defined purely by self-conscious 
'inner' space , or mind, is to be found in Charles Taylor 1985a . Such a view 
would not bring about a beautiful trans-(;uitural shared experience but would 
entail that the outlooks of other societies would be close to incomprehensible 
(1985a: 280-81). 
8 A charming example of this last point in Bali is where celebration of the 'night 
of Siva' (see Teeuw et al. 1969) is reponedly on the increase as high priests 
now use a compilation of versions of the Siwa Ratri by the distinguished Dutch 
scholar C. Hooykaas (1964). 
9 	 More anthropological debate than might appear is concerned, perlocutionarily, 
with championing factional interest rather than argument. Behind the osten· 
sible aim of writing academic history, whole books are even devoted to 
reconstructing genealogies (e.g. Kuper 1973 ; Bloch 1983). Nor, at such clan 
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gatherings as conferences of the Association of Social Anthropologists. are 
senior members above pronouncing judgement on whether papers presented 
constitute proper anthropology or not. 
10 	 There is a fascinating history, still largely to be written , of the relationship 
between European political and economic domination of Africa. the Americas 
and Asia , and the growth of a scholarly tradition in which the West's hegemony 
is established and perpetuated . 1n part this seems to have required both a 
distancing and stereotyping (Ardener 1987) and a diversification of the Other 
(Africa is primitive and without a past ; the Americas cruel Or fanlastic; 
China ancient and ossified; 1ndia ancient and degenerate ; Arab stark and 
fanatic). Unsurprisingly. perhaps, it is often discomfiting trends. which may 
subsequently be perceived to hold more for the authors' own societies than for 
those whom they claim to describe, that are the most fervently projected on to 
the Other (Inden 1986) , At the same time, ironically, Western philosophers 
have often required the Other,; for instance India, as foil for such otherwise 
opposed visions as those of both Gennan Romanticism and the Utilitarianism 
of J , S. Mill (1820), quite apart from the work of Hegel (1919) and of Marx on 
the Asiatic Mode of production, on which see 1nden forthcoming. Something 
similar may hold of Java in the work of von Humboldt (1836-39) , 
11 	 Now that the long-lost capital of the supposedly mercantile empire of Sriwijaya 
in Sumatra has reponedly been located . it will be interesting to see whether. 
and how, these stereotypes are rc-evaluated . 
12 Sometimes the reason is given a collective nature : people are too democratic. 
Democracy. or egalitarianism. is a frequent explanatory deus ex rn(Jchina for 
failure. This is the more interesting in that most South East Asian peoples 3re 
often described (by the same authors) as remarkably rankcd or hierarchical. 
On a further oscillation , see the next footno te . 
13 The position in fact is slightly more complicated because it is widely assumed 
that South East Asians are at once too individualistic to allow for order 
(everyone goes their own way) and confonnist to whatever is at hand (they 
mechanically reproduce cultural values , including individualism), They lose out 
coming and going. 
14 Perhaps the most invoked ancestor is van Ossenbruggen 1918, although Onvlee 
1949 and the syntheses by van Wouden and J, p , B, de Josselin de Jong (both 
1935) are important. On the construction of this tradition and its key texts, see 
p , E, de Josselin de Jong 1983a, 1984. 
15 	 A great deal of effort has gone into defining Indonesia as a field of study . 
This is the more remarkable in that Indonesia began as a colonial fiction and 
incorporates what one might. if one is so inClined , consider pans of Melanesia 
-not just as forgettable adjuncts but uncomfonably close to the paradigm 
cases: see de Josselin de Jong 1984, 
16 'If one stays for any length of time in a contemporary Javanese village what 
comes to strike one most forcibly, aside from the crowdedness and the poveny. 
is the general fonnlessness of the life there. the essential vagueness of social 
structure, the looseness of ties between individuals, , .' (19590: 34) , I leave 
the reader to reflect on how this authoritative vision is established . 
17 Geertz's former student, Boon, reads (his as 'organizational planes of signifi­
cance' (1977: 59, from Geertz 1959b : 992), thereby treating them as part 
of an indigenous. rather than an analytic, classification . Indeed. Geertz's first 
plane, the temple system, is described as 'a simplified model of Balinese social 
structure ... sufficient to permit its participants to find their way around in it' 
(Geertz 1967: 239), 
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18 	 Among the more comical manifestations of this vision, which Boon describes 
delightfully (1976 : 78, 79), is an early sea-farer's description of a (non-existent) 
massive fortified waJl along part of the southern coast . subsequently attributed 
to his home-sickness for the city wall of Amsterdam . Another is a copy of the 
illustration of a Goan cremation which was printed with the original log of a 
ship's visit to Bali in 1598. 
19 	 Treating other peoples as a spectacle seems to be a common feature at some 
stage in their development of many Imperial Fonnations (the tenn is taken 
from Inden's fonhcoming book of that title). The Romans were not the lasl. 
In the heyday of Western colonialism. world fairs where exotic peoples were 
displayed, became an extraordinarily popular trend . (J am grateful to Burton 
Benedict , n.d ., who brought this last point to my notice .) 
20 	 Health care, fertilizers or Coca-Cola do nol necessarily come with epistemo­
logies attached . However. they are produced by societies, members of which 
set about educating others into practices, more or less successfully, which pre'­
suppose or imply certain more general views. 
21 	 Neither tenn seemed generally used to imply the mystic harmony supposedly 
connoted byadar. As if to make my earlier point, Hindu Balinese villagers now 
often adopt the Arabic term adal to talk generally of ' tradition', not only when 
using Indonesian and in iii comparative context . but in recent years by contrast 
to governmental (dinas) aspects of local affairs . Occasionally the less educated 
used ada! as a synonym for lata but no one, as far as I could establish . did so 
for krama. 
22 Ugly as it is , 'agentive' is not iii neologism but has been used in anthropology 
and linguistics precisely where ascription of agency is important . Becausegerun­
dives are marginal in English . we should not assume them (Q be moribund . 
23 In Old Javanese mala/qafJ.a connotes 'having distinctive or distinguishing 
qualities' and la/qa"a is ' action , doing (as opposed to inaction, words, thinking. 
etc .) ... means of achieving, instrument , cause' , or 'thaI by which something 
is distinguished from other things (is recognizable), characteristic quality . 
panicular (distinctive) fonn (or) . .. way of being or appearing' (Zoetmulder 
1982: 958-59), This fits Balinese usage , 
24 My apologies are due to Malcolm Bradbury from whom 1 borrow my titl~and 
implicitly the theme--of his short story of that name. 
25 	 . It was Ron Inden who first suggested how Significant [he distinction berween 
control and command is. Several of the ideas in this paper have been worked out 
over the years in discussions with him . I am of course the agent responsible for 
the present interpretation! Perhaps the most articulate scientific alternative to 
Freudian hermeneutics, the view of mind as part of an eeo-system, sets OUt to 
avoid atomist and substantivist fallacies (Bateson 1973 : Wilden 1980) . although 
the cybernetic model is . in fact . a sublle way of perpetuating closure . 
26 	 Carol Warren gives an interesting example of a group of 12 families who wished 
to form a new banjar (forthcoming) . Whatever the political exigencies of the 
dispute. the members of the group seemed to feel themselves to be different 
and a need fa express this . A similar process has happened in, among other 
places, the settlement of Tenga hpadang in Northern Gianyar where I worked , 
when high castes (triwangsa) split off from low castes Uaba) , 
27 	 As in the French laire enrager, compare Indonesian marah and murka, both 
indicating anger , have transitive fonns memarahi and memurkai ' to be angry 
at', but memarahkan and memurkakan 'to infuriate someone' . While the rough 
and ready application of moods is adcquate for present purposes, the situation 
is almost certainly much more complicated and badly needs study. 
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28 	 It is a small point but, like bewitching, memory. knowledge and sight occur 
almost always in verb fonn not as nouns. It so happens that the Indonesian 
gloss of ' verb' is kala kerja. literally an aClion , or work. word (kerja derives 
from korya). Pending funher research into Balinese ethno-grammar I would 
not make too much of this. but it is interesting that Balinese should adopt and 
make use of the Indonesian expression . 
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